At the end of April, Russia and Georgia finished the second round of bilateral negotiations on Russia’s WTO accession in Bern, Switzerland. The sides have not reached a compromise on the issue of customs checkpoints in the Georgian breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, seemingly deadlocking the negotiations. However, some recent developments hint at a possibility of a compromise in the near future. The third round of bilateral negotiations will take place in the end of May.
Following the brief war with Georgia in August 2008, Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s independence, but Georgia has insisted that the regions are part of its sovereign territory and that Russia’s continued presence there is an illegal occupation. The dispute was raised during bilateral negotiations on Russia’s entry into the WTO when Georgia demanded that Georgian customs officers supervise checkpoints in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, threatening to veto Russia’s accession. Russia has not agreed to make such a concession and has continued to deny Georgia’s authority over the provinces. Russia has been working to join the WTO since 1993 and it is now by far the largest economy in the world outside the WTO.
On April 26, Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov said during a visit to South Ossetia and Abkhazia that Russia could join the WTO without Georgia’s consent, “based on the underlying principles of the WTO,” without further elaboration. Analysts have pointed out that historically, countries have always joined the WTO only with the unanimous consent of all WTO members. However, according to the treaty’s fine print, accession only requires the approval of two-thirds of the 153 member countries. Russia would likely be able to join the WTO if the matter is decided by a vote of the entire WTO membership, as the United States and the European Union have already stated their support for Russia’s accession. However, Georgia’s foreign minister Grigol Vashadze dismissed Lavrov’s statement as “blackmail and bluff,” arguing that there had never been any non-unanimous accessions to the WTO, and there would not be an exception for Russia.
Although the second round of negotiations did not produce results, Georgia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Nino Kalandadze said at the beginning of May that the Russian delegation for the first time agreed to discuss specific technical possibilities for restoring Georgia’s customs control at checkpoints at Psou River in Abkhazia and Roki Tunnel in South Ossetia. Kalandadze did not elaborate, and officials in Tbilisi and Moscow declined to comment. However, Russian sources have suggested that a possible compromise might involve releasing data on commodity circulation by customs authorities of Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The source argued that such an outcome would satisfy Russia, as it would let it avoid physical presence of Georgian customs officials in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while also providing important customs information to Georgia, which currently has no access to customs data.
The U.S. position on the issue has been ambivalent. On the one hand, President Obama reiterated last summer that “Russia belongs in the WTO,” and this statement was echoed by many other U.S. officials. On the other hand, President Obama’s special assistant for Russian and Eurasian Affairs Michael McFaul said in early March that Russia-Georgia WTO talks are a “bilateral issue in which Washington has no role,” and denied allegations that Washington was pressuring Georgia to drop its objections. Finally, after Lavrov’s statement in late April, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Tina Kaidanow expressed some sympathy for Georgia’s position, saying that Washington is “supportive of Russian accession, but it also believes that Georgia has legitimate trade concerns that need to be addressed.”
Experts have suggested that there are several ways in which the U.S. could make Russia’s WTO accession more attractive for Georgia. For example, in return for Georgia’s approval of Russia’s WTO entry, the U.S. could help Tbilisi negotiate a free-trade agreement with the European Union, provide Georgia with grants and concessions under the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation program or offer Tbilisi back-channel assurances that Moscow will drop its 2006 embargo on the import of Georgian wines and mineral water if Russia joins the WTO.
It remains to be seen whether or not the U.S. will use any of these leverage points to influence Georgia’s position on Russia’s WTO accession, and whether or not Russia and Georgia will reach a compromise on the customs checkpoints issue during the third round of bilateral negotiations at the end of this month.
Possibly related posts:
- Georgia-Russia WTO Talks
- Ukraine Continues to Resist Customs Union Overtures
- Russia Continues to Protect its Auto Industry
- Russia Gets Closer to WTO
- U.S.-Russia Chicken War Near Truce
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